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Animal protection statutes are of
course extremely valuable, and they
might be made even more so if they were
formulated to give private rights of action to their beneficiaries- the animals
themselves. But what I would like to explore here is the idea of extending common law rights of action to animals. Admittedly, permitting animals to sue in
contract and tort now seems fanciful, but
my hope is that this article will provide
an initial step toward bringing it about.
The right to sue in contract would
seem not especially useful, since animals generally lack the mental capacity
to contract. However, the concept of
quasi contract might be invoked on behalf of animals who were injured as a
result of justified reliance on another's
acts. An example might be a pet animal
or a zoo animal that was abandoned
after having lost its ability to survive on
its own, or that was abandoned in a
locale where survival on its own was impossible. The monkeys who were taught
to use sign language and who were recently threatened with becoming the subjects
of laboratory experiments also might
have had a cause of action under this
theory. Could not having taught these
monkeys to use language be viewed as
having created an obligation to keep
them in an environment in which they
could use this skill?
284

Actions in tort, however, present
more significant possibilities, and the
situations that might give rise to tort actions for animals seem much more analogous to those that give rise to tort actions for humans. They may, in fact, be
identical. Suppose a man is crossing the
street and is hit by a negligent motorist
and suffers a broken leg. He can sue in
tort for compensation for his medical
bills, his pain and suffering, and any loss
of income that results from the injury.
Now suppose the same man had been
walking his dog and had suffered the
same accident, and, in addition, his dog
had suffered a broken leg. Under present
law, the man could recover veterinary expenses and any loss of income that resulted from the dog's injury (assuming
the dog did television commercials or
the like). But there could be no recovery
for the dog's pain and suffering, even
though the dog's pain and suffering
might have been equal to or greater than
the man's. Yet, as Peter Singer showed in
Animal Liberation, there is no relevant
difference between humans and animals
that would justify considering the pain
of one more important than the pain of
the other. Incidentally, measuring a
dog's pain and suffering would seem only slightly more difficult than measuring
a man's.
Tort actions might also have valu/NT
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able potential because they could lead to
the questioning of conventional practices such as hunting, factory farming,
and animal experimentation. Animal cruelty statutes are rarely invoked against
these practices because the state's attorney must be willing to prosecute, and
because criminal laws are narrowly construed. But any victim of a tort can set
the wheels of justice in motion. Suppose
someone, without justification, shoots
your pet. If animals could sue in tort you
could bring an action on behalf of your
pet for his pain and suffering. Now suppose a hunter, without justification (apart
from "sport") shoots a wild animal, and
an animal rights activist sues on the
animal's behalf for its pain and suffering. If the court attempted to rule in
favor of your pet but not in favor of the
wild animal, it would be faced with having to distinguish the two cases, and
might realize that, from the points of
view of the two animals, the cases are indistinguishable. And, since the animals
would be the plaintiffs, it would be their
points of view that mattered.
A final issue that must be raised is
the type of remedies that should be
awarded in common law actions by animals. Injunctions would be appropriate
in some cases, and the species of the
plaintiff would raise no conceptual problems. In cases in which monetary damages were appropriate, however, a problem
would arise from the fact that animals
have little use for money. A pet animal's
damages could be put in trust and spent
for the animal's benefit, but, unless trust
expenditures were for items that the
owner would not supply anyway, the damages in effect would accrue to the owners.
However, spending the recovery on luxuries would not solve the problem because most animals have little need of
material luxuries, and most such items
(diamond studded collars, for example)
are really for the owner's benefit.
Furthermore, animals should be able
to recover for wrongful death as well as
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for personal injury, and dead animals
certainly would have no use for money.
(The concept of estates for animals is a
can of worms that will not be opened on
this occasion.) One possible way to handle monetary damages might be to have
them paid to the state; awards would
then still have a deterrent, though not a
compensatory purpose. I would favor,
however, the use of damages to fund animal rights groups working for the benefit of the injured animal's species or
class (e.g., zoo animals), or to fund environmental groups working for the benefit of the injured animal's habitat.
Permitting animals to sue in contract
and tort would not only remedy specific
injustices and provide a source of funding
for animal rights groups; it might also
contribute toward a change of consciousness, consisting in part of a recognition that animals' interests deserve equal
consideration with humans'. As Christopher Stone wrote in Should Trees Have
Standing?- Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 Southern California Law
Review 450, 453 (1972), "[t]hroughout
legal history, each successive extension
of rights to some new entity has been ... a
bit unthinkable." I hope that this article
will at least make the extension of common law rights to animals less unthinkable.

CORRECTION- In Vol. 4, No. 3 of the
journal, p. 250, the reference to Dr. Peter
Singer's criticisms of Australian codes on
animal welfare practices was incorrectly
cited as being published in the Winter
1982 edition of Ag: his critique appeared
in the Winter '82 edition of the Australian publication Outcry.
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